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None for the Money: How We Actually Make Monetary Decisions 
Michael C. Mullarkey 
Scott Parker 
American University 
Abstract 
Often, critics of academic scholarship point to the failure of academic findings translating to practical applications. 
This paper tackles an issue that most people deal with every single day, how to make smart decisions with their money. The 
literature scrutinizing the psychology of monetary decisions is vast. However, in a literature so comprehensive it can be easy to 
miss the forest for all the trees. By returning primarily to two authors who did much of the foundational research on the subject 
and expanding upon their work, this paper examines the overwhelming prevalence, causes, and future implications of irrational 
monetary decision making. 
Keywords: decision-making, money, heuristics, positive psychology 
A Literature Review 
Life is uncertain, and there is a lot of 
information available about a stunning number of 
variables. However, monetary transactions are often 
anything but rational. The lay consensus seems to be 
that "other people" make irrational decisions with 
money, but few people would admit to any 
systematic irrationality, especially their own. How 
monetary decisions are made obviously has a huge 
effect on everyday life, since monetary transactions 
and the decisions surrounding them are absolutely 
integral in all forms of society. If people are making 
decisions differently than they themselves realize, 
how can they expect to make them well? Also, if 
economic models do not account for these patterns of 
irrational decision-making, how can they purport to 
accurately predict consumer behavior on a macro or 
micro level? And just how irrational can people be, 
and how does that affect purchasing decisions and 
general decision-making involving money? What 
further research can be done to advance our 
understanding of these phenomena? 
Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman were 
influential Israeli psychologists who helped pioneer 
the field of behavioral economics. Their historic 
collaboration began in 1971 at the Oregon Research 
Institute (Poundstone, 2010, p. 87). To further 
understand how people make decisions about money, 
they simply asked two questions with 2 possible 
responses to each. In the first decision, participants 
were asked whether they would rather have a 100% 
chance of gaining $240 (Option A) or a 25% chance 
of gaining $1,000 and a 75% chance of gaining 
nothing (Option B). 84% of subjects chose Option A. 
The second decision was either a sure loss of $750 
(Option C) or a 75% chance of losing $1,000 and a 
25% chance of losing nothing (Option D). 87% of 
subjects chose Option D (Tversky, 1981, p. 454). 
These decisions do not seem ridiculous at face value.  
A sure gain puts dollars in one's hand right now, and 
if there's any chance one can avoid a loss he or she 
might as well try to. Overall, 73% of respondents 
chose both Options A and D. 
However, when framed in a different way, 
those two decisions are exposed as the least rational 
decisions one could possibly make given those 
options. Subjects were asked to choose one of two 
options, both involving two scenarios. The first 
option involved first a 25% chance to win $240 and 
then a 75% chance to lose $760 (Option 1). The 
second option involved first a 25% chance to win 
$250 and then a 75% chance to lose $750 (Option 2). 
When framed this way, 100% of the subjects chose 
the Option 2, and who would not? One has an 
equivalent chance of both gaining more money as 
well as losing less. Taken together, the Option 1's 
scenarios are mathematically equivalent to the most 
common responses given during the first series of 
questions Options A and D, while the second option's 
scenarios are mathematically equivalent to the least 
popular series of decisions, Options B and C 
(Tversky, 1981, p. 454-455). However, as can now be 
observed, the combination of Options B and C is the 
most logical, rational combination that one could 
choose. Only 3% of the subject pool chose both 
options B and C. However, it would be 
understandable to believe that this effect might 
disappear whenever real money and payouts are 
involved because then people will actually care 
enough to pay close attention. These same kinds of 
questions have been asked with real money on the 
line, and the effect remains (Tversky, 1981, p. 454-
455). So while most everyone believes they are 
rational in general and especially when it comes to 
money, empirical data says that not only are our 
internal calculators broken, they are probably not 
even properly turned on. 
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Studies in this vein are not flashy to run or 
participate in. There are no gorillas running through 
the video, no confederates screaming as fake shocks 
are administered, and no college students 
transforming into ruthless prison guards and 
submissive prisoners. However, researchers are 
discovering what affects our abilities to be rational 
about money and all the important decisions 
surrounding monetary transactions. This data can be 
used to better understand why markets rise and fall, 
how reasonable, intelligent people can be suckered 
into loans that make foreclosure all but certain, and 
just how bad people are at valuing the possessions 
they treasure. Admittedly, the literature on this topic 
is so vast that there is no way that it can be 
adequately covered in a single paper. As a result, 
rather than just bouncing around aimlessly from 
study to study, much of the initial literature review 
will focus on the work by Tversky and Kahneman. 
Kahneman won the Nobel Prize for Economics in 
2002 for his work with Tversky, who was denied an 
opportunity to share in the prize himself only by his 
untimely death several years before. 
Following the initial examination of the 
literature, this review will primarily focus on 
practical applications of this vast academic 
knowledge. First, the importance of monetary 
transactions will be established. There are probably 
very few souls who would argue against the 
importance of monetary decisions, but the breadth 
and depth of their importance on an everyday basis is 
often taken for granted and goes unnoticed by most 
of the population. Next, the inherent irrationality in 
many of these monetary decisions will be exposed 
and examined. People's abilities to be human 
calculators doing the arithmetic of utility in their 
heads will come under serious fire. Then, the 
implications of the irrationality of these decisions 
will be discussed. Is being more rational always the 
answer? Finally, with better decision making 
processes regarding money in place, the definition of 
utility will be further challenged. While human 
beings according to some economic models want 
nothing more than to die with the most toys, while 
some real life human beings want to see Europe and 
leave their kids to fend for themselves without a trust 
fund on which they can rely. Therefore, the 
emotional side of utility will be further explored. 
People could view money as valuable for a 
variety of reasons. For many, money is the 
commodity that can be used to acquire basic living 
conditions and food. Smaller amounts of money are 
worth more to people who have less. For instance, 
people become much happier as they earn more 
money in a year up until just past a living wage. After 
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that, the amount that people get happier per unit of 
money drops considerably (Myers, 2008, p. 41). For 
some, money is the means to achieving high status in 
society, which can be telegraphed through expensive 
material goods and/or experiences. In this case, 
people care about their social status as measured by 
material wealth because that material wealth can 
symbolize non-observable abilities (Rege, 2008, p. 
240). A surgeon would not expect his friends to 
understand his skills relative to a particularly difficult 
surgery, but assumes they will understand he is 
skilled if he has a fancy car and a big house. 
For others, money is security, providing 
them with a safety net if something goes wrong in 
their lives. For example, people aged 55-64 are the 
people most likely to start a new business while 
people aged 20-34 are actually the least likely age 
group to do so, despite the conventional wisdom that 
younger people take risks more often. While a variety 
of factors could be at work, one possibility is that 
with money in the bank and financial security 
assured, baby boomers can justify leaving jobs with 
health insurance, benefits, etc. because they have 
security in case of failure and/or emergency. On the 
other hand, 20-34 year olds most likely do not have 
that nest egg stored away, and cannot justify taking 
the same risks (Stangler, 2009, p. 4). 
However, money being viewed as 
opportunity is one big factor that often gets 
overlooked when the value of money is being 
discussed. If one has money, then one can anticipate 
all the different desirable experiences and things that 
the money can buy. This line of reasoning can even 
apply to those who do not have money. They view 
having money as the potential to move out of a 
crime-infested neighborhood, take their spouse out 
more often, or send their kids to a better school. In 
many cases, anticipation of good things actually 
makes people happier than experiencing the good 
things themselves (Richins, 1992, p. 230). Money in 
the bank, or even just the idea of it, allows people to 
hope for and anticipate a wide variety of things, and 
as the money increases so can the anticipatory 
imagination. These conditions are surely not isolated, 
as all of them likely play a role in the valuation of 
money for each individual. Essentially, money may 
function and be viewed in a range of different ways, 
but all of those functions and views are essential to 
how the individual operates. The field of positive 
psychology would do well to further address the 
conception of money as opportunity. 
Convincing anyone that monetary 
transactions are important is not very difficult. 
Convincing that same person of the often-stunning 
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irrationality of monetary decisions will prove far 
more difficult. Obviously, there is a huge disconnect 
between reality as portrayed by research and the 
reality perceived by a vast majority of people. The 
above average effect could conceivably account for 
the difference between perception and reality. In 
general, the above-average effect predicts that people 
will, on average, rate themselves as above average on 
a wide variety of skills. This effect affects people's 
perceptions of their ability to make monetary 
decisions (Dunning, 1989, p. 1082). However, this 
factor alone probably does not account for the lack of 
rational decision-making. Imagine a group of athletes 
who wake up early one morning to go a tryout for a 
prestigious team. For all of these athletes, doing well 
in this tryout is essential to their livelihoods and their 
future in the sport. If you gave all of these players a 
survey before the tryout and asked how good at this 
sport they were relative to the others trying out, it is 
relatively safe to say that one would see the above-
average effect, as this effect has generalized to a wide 
variety of skills (Dunning, 1989, p. 1082). 
Then, the players are asked by the coaches 
to individually give a demonstration of their skills for 
a few minutes for the coaches. After all the players 
demonstrate the skills, the coaches use a systematic 
scoring system to rate their abilities. The next day, all 
the players are called back in to the arena by the 
coaches. The shocked players are informed none of 
them have made the team. Some players had 
performed poorly relative to the others, but some 
players had done systematically better compared to 
the others. There may have even been one or two 
special players who showed a spectacular skill set. So 
why did no one make the team? All of the players 
demonstrated soccer skills during their tryouts, and 
the coaches were holding a tryout for a basketball 
team. 
The above average effect alone cannot 
explain the entire disparity between people's 
perceived abilities and actual abilities. If people are 
not playing the game they think they are, the above 
average effect is the least of their worries. Monetary 
decisions really are made on an entirely different 
playing field than most people realize. If an athlete 
thinks that he or she needs soccer skills to be 
successful both now and in his or her future, he or 
she will spend a lot of her efforts developing soccer 
skills. Some of those skills will have generalizability 
to sports in general, but many will not. Since many 
people believe monetary decisions are primarily 
rational, they arm themselves with data, spreadsheets, 
and algorithms. Unfortunately, while these skills are 
by no means useless, they are not the complete skill 
set necessary for monetary decisions. 
So what are the necessary tools for dealing 
with monetary decisions? Before one can understand 
that, one must more closely examine some of the 
irrational decision making behaviors that have been 
systematically measured and analyzed. By 
understanding the variety of problems with the 
rational decision making model of behavior, one can 
hone in on different skill sets that can be improved 
outside of what he or she might expect. 
The Tversky example given at the start of 
the paper is a good place to begin. The shock value of 
only 3% of people making the rational choice under 
certain conditions is useful as an attention grabber. 
However, understanding the conditions that produce 
that level of irrationality is far more intriguing. 
Tversky describes several other situations where 
people make irrational choices, and his main 
explanation for the irrationality is the framing of the 
questions. For instance, in the first example, 100% of 
people make the rational choice when they only have 
to make one decision and choose between two 
options. However, only 3% make the correct decision 
when the options are framed as 2 separate decisions 
with two options each. One possible explanation is 
that people fail to consider the cumulative 
implications of their decisions when the decisions are 
presented separately. Essentially, people appear to be 
making the decisions independently without regard 
for how the other decision should impact their choice. 
This effect is known as minimal account, where only 
the direct consequences of an act are considered 
before it is made (Tversky, 1981, p. 455-457). 
Another phenomenon that can have a 
profound effect on decision-making is outcome 
framing. Tversky uses the example of a down on his 
luck gambler who has lost $140 at the horseracing 
track. Now, it's the last race of the day, and the 
gambler is considering betting $10 on a horse that has 
15:1 odds to win the race. How he or his buddies 
frame this bet will likely determine whether he will 
actually make it or not. One way to frame the 
decision would be as a likely total loss of $150, since 
the horse with 15:1 odds is unlikely to win the race. 
However, if the gambler does not adjust his reference 
point, he will view the gamble as a potential to break 
even instead of as a likely loss, thereby rationalizing 
a gamble he would not have made on the first race of 
the day. Studies show that the most bets placed on 
long odds horses occur on the last race of the day, so 
it appears that the second type of outcome framing 
impacts hard luck gamblers (Tversky, 1981, p. 456). 
And anyone who had money in the stock market 
during the recent crash and recession had to feel like 
a hard-luck gambler, so could this effect have caused 
at least some people to take even more risks to win 
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back what they had lost? This paper was not able to 
find any current data to that effect, but perhaps that 
domain should be further explored, along with what 
differentiated people willing to take on more 
potential loss to try to win it all back from people 
who pulled out of the market. 
Extensions on minimal account theory have 
included work that looks at how much people value 
their time. The typical study includes first a 
calculator priced at a lower amount, $15, and a jacket 
priced at $125. In that scenario, 68% of subjects are 
willing to drive twenty minutes to save $5 on the 
calculator assuming they're about to buy both items. 
However, when the jacket costs $15 and the 
calculator costs $125, only 29% were willing to drive 
twenty minutes to save $5 on the calculator. By this 
virtue, people are only accounting for the price of the 
calculator and not the jacket. Since they do not look 
beyond immediate consequences, people end up 
placing very different money values on their time in 
different situations. In a follow up study, which 
included nine different pricing scenarios and fill in 
the blank prices to eliminate other potential 
confounds, subjects ended up valuing twenty minutes 
of time from as valuable as $454.81 to as 
inconsequential as $1.88 (Azar, 2007, p. 6). 
While these framing effects do have 
profound effects on decision-making, so far many of 
the mechanisms of how they work are less well 
understood. Minimal account could be explained via 
a biological mechanism. From an evolutionary 
perspective, the people that survived were the ones 
who were able to make snap decisions that kept them 
alive, not people who would crunch long-term 
calculations in their heads. On the other hand, 
minimal account could be explained as a result of 
cognitive heuristics. If someone is paying only 
minimal attention to the decision, he or she will make 
the decision using peripheral processing. This route 
relies on shortcuts, known as heuristics, to make 
decisions (Tversky, 1974, p. 1124). Going back to the 
original Tversky example, the sure gain of $240 just 
seems right, and any subsequent decisions are not 
factored into the choice, a decision made as a result 
of heuristic based decision-making. Central 
processing, where one is focused solely on making 
the decision and willing to spend the cognitive 
resources to make the decision, would make the 
decision by taking both options into account and 
actually performing all the calculations necessary to 
make the best choice. As previously discussed, this 
type of decision-making is paradoxically both 
common sense and appears to almost never happen in 
real world decision-making. 
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Going outside of the normal realms explored 
while addressing this issue, the social psychological 
concept of cognitive dissonance could provide an 
explanation for outcome framing. People want to 
view themselves in a positive light and will change 
their beliefs to give their actions more of a positive 
spin. Consider again the case of the gambler with the 
$140 debt and the choice whether to bet $10 on the 
horse with 15:1 odds. One reason he might choose to 
frame his outcome as a chance to break even is 
because he has been gambling all day. He does not 
want to view his past actions in a negative light, so he 
changes his beliefs. He likely would not believe a 
15:1 shot had a great chance to win at the start of the 
day, but to resolve his dissonance he will gladly 
change his beliefs as long as he can justify his 
previous actions (Harmon-Jones, 2008, p. 73). 
However, this is not to say that only 
particular combinations of choices lead to 
irrationality. There is another framing phenomenon 
affecting the individual choices. People 
systematically have been shown to be risk-averse 
when making decisions about potential gains, but 
risk-taking when making decisions about potential 
losses. Tversky's dramatic example includes 
choosing a program that either certainly saves 200 
people from a diseased population of 600 or a 
program that has a one third chance of saving 
everyone in that population and a two-thirds chance 
of saving no one. 72% of the subjects chose the 
certainty. However, when the question was reframed, 
the result was very different. If the options were 
framed as either adopting a program where 400 
people will die or a program that has a one third 
probability of no one dying, 78% of subjects chose 
the program that has a one third probability of no one 
dying (Tversky, 1981, 453). Again, these options are 
mathematically equivalent, but the framing of the 
questions drastically affected the outcome. This 
decision-making quirk extends to monetary decision-
making, as these principles are the bedrock of 
prospect theory, developed by Tversky and 
Kahneman in 1979 (Levy, 1992, p. 180). 
There have been a multitude of variations on 
this particular study, and some of them have directly 
involved monetary decisions. One variation involved 
measuring certain emotions being experienced by the 
subjects and then having them make monetary 
decisions, one positively framed and the other 
negatively framed. The study found that the negative 
emotions distress and anger do not moderate framing 
effects. Essentially, negative emotions are not 
associated with people given a positively framed 
question becoming more risk averse, nor are they 
associated with subjects given a negatively framed 
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question become more risk-taking. Also, the positive 
emotion enthusiasm does not appear to moderate 
framing effects either. However, the emotion of 
enthusiasm was associated with greater risk taking 
behavior overall (Druckman, 2008, p. 311). 
This study should definitely be expanded 
upon. First, the inability of negative emotions to 
moderate framing effects could speak to the theory 
that negative emotions tend to focus one's attention 
on a problem and might therefore even exacerbate 
certain framing effects (Kok, 2008, p. 3). Also, 
positive emotions other than enthusiasm could have 
differential effects on framing as well. In the same 
study, the experimenters also examined the effects of 
emotion on a non-monetary decision, one that 
involved saving lives. In that scenario, the emotions 
experienced had a significant effect on how much the 
subject was affected by the framing. Subjects who 
reported being more distressed were shown to be 
much more susceptible to framing. However, subjects 
who reported enthusiasm were much less affected by 
framing. Anger did not appear to either accentuate or 
diminish the framing effect (Druckman, 2008, p. 
310). 
Perhaps the link between the emotions and 
the monetary question itself was not strong enough to 
measure the effects adequately, since there was no 
experimental inducement of any emotion. While the 
other question dealt life and death, an emotionally 
loaded topic, the monetary question dealt with $1,000 
of a community's money. While $1,000 is not a small 
sum of money, an entire community losing that 
amount is likely not associated with nearly as much 
emotion as the possibility of hundreds of people 
dying. Future experimenters would have several 
options. First, the experimenters could 
experimentally induce different positive and negative 
emotions, and then observe the effects on adherence 
to framing effects while making a monetary decision. 
If the experimenters choose to stick with self-
reported emotions, they could raise the stakes of the 
question by having the subject imagine a substantial 
amount of their own money being on the line, such as 
a college or retirement fund. Also, as alluded to 
earlier, there should be greater differentiation among 
emotions, especially positive emotions, where 
differentiation is often neglected. For example, could 
elevation have a different effect than schadenfreude 
on adherence to framing? A differential in the effects 
of different positive emotions on other processes 
suggests that this is a possibility worth exploring 
(Kok, 2008, p. 4). 
While these framing effects are all 
interesting and flow together well, they were not  
Tversky and Kahneman's first or most well 
recognized contribution to the field. Not to say that 
the framing effect research was not influential, on the 
contrary it is one of the defming foundations of 
understanding practical decision-making in real 
marketplaces. However, the original collaboration 
between Tversky and Kahneman, while not dealing 
much with monetary decision making directly, broke 
down the use of heuristics in decision-making 
processes when uncertainties were involved 
(Tversky, 1974, p. 1124). First, an understanding of 
this influential paper is necessary for anyone wanting 
to understand the psychology of decision-making in 
general and can be applied in a multitude of ways to 
understand monetary choices. 
The paper primarily discusses heuristics, 
which were briefly mentioned before as an 
explanation for minimal account. The use of 
heuristics in decision-making is widespread and the 
data should be terrifying to anyone who thinks that 
any type of decision is made rationally with any 
consistency whatsoever. Three different types of 
heuristics play a key role in decision-making: 
Representativeness, 	 Availability, 	 and 
Anchoring/Adjustment. By examining these 
heuristics at a basic level, one can acquire a more 
general understanding that will allow them to apply 
their knowledge of the heuristic to a variety of 
monetary decision-making processes (Tversky, 1974, 
p. 1124). 
The first heuristic the duo explores is 
representativeness. Simply put, the representativeness 
heuristic causes one to make decisions based on how 
similar something, someone, or a situation seems to 
other things, people, or situations people have 
encountered (Tversky, 1974, p. 1124). On the 
surface, this strategy might seem like a good idea. 
People learn from their previous experiences, so 
being able to tell that something is similar to 
something else does not seem like it should 
necessarily lead to poor judgments. However, people 
will often allow their intuitive judgments that two 
things are similar overwhelm substantial evidence 
that would result in a different decision being made. 
For example, people are often insensitive to base 
rates, or how prevalent a certain thing or person is in 
a particular sample. People were told that they were 
reading a description of one man out of 100 possible 
subjects. The description is as follows: "Dick is a 30 
year old man. He is married with no children. A man 
of high ability and high motivation, he promises to be 
quite successful in his field. He is well liked by his 
colleagues (Tversky, 1974, p. 1125)." The subjects 
were then asked to assign a probability that Dick was 
an engineer. In one condition, the subjects were told 
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there were 30 engineers and 70 lawyers, and in the 
other condition the subjects were told there were 70 
engineers and 30 lawyers. Subjects assigned a 
probability of 50% in both conditions. If the subjects 
had been paying attention to base rates, they certainly 
would have rated Dick being an engineer as a greater 
probability in the 70 engineers condition and a lesser 
probability in the 30 engineers condition. 
The unlikelihood that someone is attending 
to base rates can have a profound effect on his or her 
ability to make decisions about money. Essentially, 
learning a minimal amount of information about 
something where the base rates are not known causes 
people to make more irrational decisions than if they 
did not have that information. So, someone being 
swayed by one particular article or quick advice from 
a friend of a friend will likely make poorer choices 
about which product to buy or which stock to invest 
in than someone who knows generally what kind of 
stocks or products are available in that category and 
nothing else. Based on this principle, it may be better 
to go in blind than gather incomplete information. 
Tversky and Kahneman also explain how 
the gambler's fallacy contributes to errors in the 
context of the representativeness heuristic. The 
gambler's fallacy occurs when people convince 
themselves that events independently determined by 
chance somehow have memory and that a certain 
outcome is "due." A classic example is someone 
seeing red come up several times in a row on a 
roulette wheel, then betting on black for the next spin 
(Tversky, 1974, p. 1125). This fallacy occurs because 
of a poor understanding of how chance translates to 
small number settings. Since a fair coin is has a 50/50 
chance of coming up heads in the long run, people 
will believe that a heads is inevitable after a run of 
tails. However, the law of large numbers applies to 
exactly what is says it does, large numbers of trials. 
Trying to apply the law of large numbers to a series 
of ten coin flips is the equivalent of trying to apply 
the theory of relativity to a car going twenty miles 
per hour, both misguided and not likely to help one 
address the relevant issues. Investors may be 
susceptible to this fallacy as well. If the market has 
gone unexpected directions several times, it might be 
tempting for the investor to intuit that the market 
somehow owes him or her one. This temptation can 
lead to devastating results, because the movement of 
the market is entirely independent of one individual's 
decisions. 
The gambler's fallacy has also been 
observed in real casinos with players betting their 
own money. Interestingly, if a person exhibits a 
tendency towards the "hot hand" fallacy as well, 
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where the player will bet on a particular outcome 
because it has occurred several times in a row 
(Sundall, 2006, p. 9). While obviously the gambler 
cannot commit both of these fallacies at the same 
time, the fact that gamblers who are susceptible to 
one are often susceptible to the other could be useful 
data in several ways. First, there could be an 
underlying cause that contributes to fallacies. Locus 
of control has been suggested as a possible cause but 
the data gathered seems insufficient (Sundall, 2006, 
p. 10). However, regardless of whether locus of 
control is the underlying cause, understanding that 
the two fallacies often do coexist can help researchers 
reassess the issue of finding the causal mechanism 
for both fallacies. Also, if the gambler's fallacy is 
related to the hot hand fallacy, perhaps it and/or other 
fallacies are also interrelated. Further research where 
experimenters investigated the intercorrelations 
between a variety of fallacies would be a difficult 
undertaking, but a worthwhile endeavor to see how 
these decision making shortcuts are related. Isolating 
and examining the effects of individual fallacies in 
the lab is a great starting point, but observing how 
these fallacies are related during actual decision 
making processing will give investigators a wide 
potential of new avenues to study. 
Another effect that sneaks past people's 
attention is their general insensitivity to 
predictability. If one reads a description of a 
company, how favorable the description is in regards 
to the company affects how profitable that person 
thinks the company will be, even if the description 
has nothing to do with things that would generate 
profit (Tversky, 1974, p. 1126). In other words, if 
someone were to show a subject a positive 
description of a student's extensive volunteer work 
with the homeless, that subject would rate that 
student's potential for academic success at a higher 
rate than if the description of the volunteer work was 
only mildly favorable, even though how a person is 
as a volunteer likely says very little about how they 
are as a student, considering the myriad of contextual 
differences between the two situations. 
A cousin of this fallacy is the illusion of 
validity. This illusion plays on the fact that people 
will generally make predictions about someone or 
something based on whatever information they have, 
even if they know that information is spotty at best or 
woefully out of date (Tversky, 1974, p. 1126). 
Especially when the information is consistent with 
itself, such as a ROTC cadet receiving several 
identical scores on aptitude tests, people will be 
especially confident with their predictions as opposed 
to their confidence when the scores on the aptitude 
test are more varied but average to the same score 
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However, predictability is statistically more valid if 
the input scores are independent and varied as 
opposed to redundant inputs, which give a sparse 
amount of information by comparison to the more 
diverse inputs (Tversky, 1974, p. 1126). 
When it comes to monetary decisions 
specifically, one example has already been 
illustrated. Investors might be enthralled by a 
glowing report about one large company's efforts to 
go green by adding solar panels to their main office 
headquarters. However, this type of information has 
very little to do with overall profits of the company, 
thus making the data relatively useless to potential 
investors. On the other hand, a mediocre report about 
the complexities of employing green practices 
throughout the inner workings of another company 
would likely not cause investors to experience any 
kind of excitement, even thought those changes are 
much more likely to have an impact on long term 
profits and could make the company a smart 
investment. 
Also, someone can be swayed into believing 
that costs will be lower for a project than they 
actually will be because they do not attend to cues 
that could affect pricing. Unlike the other examples, 
the person is not duped primarily by the tone of the 
presentation, but rather by not knowing which 
predictive effects are important to attend to (Gunner, 
1999, 269). So, while he makes every effort to attend 
to the proper data, his inherent lack of knowledge 
causes him to attend to details that might prove 
inconsequential while ignoring data that could be 
crucial. The vicious cycle of incompetence assures 
that someone who is incompetent does not have the 
capacity to realize his or her own incompetence 
(Dunning, 2005, p. 15). Without this realization, 
many people will continue to believe they are making 
decisions about as well as can be expected, even if 
their objectively their decision making processes are 
completely nonsensical. 
Going back to the tryout analogy, it's as if 
the coaches do not flat out tell the players they were 
rejected because they displayed soccer skills while 
they were trying out for a basketball team. Instead, 
the coaches give somewhat ambiguous feedback, 
leaving the players scratching their heads. This is 
often how real feedback from monetary decision-
making works, as the results of the decisions can be 
flat out misleading. Sometimes due to chance, 
investing in the company with the solar cells will turn 
out to be a great investment, even if the actual reason 
for investing in the company was suspect. On the 
other hand, maybe the company that is trying to 
institute green practices throughout the organization  
turns out to be a bad investment because an area of 
senior management is found cooking the accounting 
books. If people look only at the consequences of the 
decision making process instead of the process itself, 
they will be giving themselves a lot of false feedback 
on what works and what does not. 
The last element of the representativeness 
heuristic Tversky and Kahneman examine is 
misunderstanding of regression to the mean. They do 
not directly reference their earlier discussion of 
gambler's fallacy, but the two are related. People 
committing the gambler's fallacy expect an 
instantaneous regression to a statistical mean, despite 
the fact most elements of chance have no memory. 
However, there is another way to misunderstand 
regression towards the mean. The classic example is 
flight instructors who gave praise after the best 
landings and punishments after the worst. 
Subsequently, the instructors noticed that the pilots 
who had been punished improved on their next 
landing while those who had been praised had a 
poorer landing the next time they were graded. These 
data points led the instructors to believe that 
punishment improved performance while praise 
diminished performance (Tversky, 1974, p. 1127). 
This conclusion demonstrates a gross 
unawareness of regression to the mean. If an average 
pilot has an exemplary landing, it follows that a 
subsequent landing will likely be less exemplary 
since the pilot has performed at the top of the scale 
and his average performance lies in the middle of the 
same scale. Thus, for every exemplary performance, 
there will be a correspondingly poor performance. 
This works the same way in reverse when an average 
pilot has a horrible landing (Tversky, 1974, p. 1127). 
So, the instructors, ignorant of the regression to the 
mean, falsely attributed the improvements in 
performance to punishment and began using more 
punishment in their teaching curriculum while 
essentially eliminating the use of praise. However, 
the psychological literature suggests these strategies 
are both counterproductive to improving 
performance, so the flight training school ended up 
seeing decreases in performance across the board. 
Investors can make this mistake as well. After 
watching an investment over-perform for a while, it 
is infinitely tempting to dissect every possible reason 
it starts performing more normally again. However, 
by seeing patterns where there are none, people could 
end up making poor decisions not only with that 
investment, but in the future as well. 
Misunderstanding of regression to the mean has been 
shown to negatively impact investment decision-
making dealing with mutual funds (Moore, 1999, p. 
98). 
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The second heuristic examined by Tversky 
and Kahneman is the availability heuristic. This 
heuristic states that people will make decisions based 
on situations or ideas that are most easily accessible 
in their minds (Tversky, 1974, p. 1127). Memories 
and experiences are not neatly filed away waiting to 
be taken off a shelf and re-examined. Manipulating 
how people recall things can be as simple as showing 
them a picture of a certain event or presenting 
numbers in an increasing or decreasing order. One 
example of a glitch in the availability heuristic is how 
easy different types of information are to retrieve. For 
example, subjects who heard a list of male and 
female celebrities recalled there being more males on 
the list when the male celebrities when the male 
celebrities were more famous and more females when 
the female celebrities were more famous (Tversky, 
1974, p. 1127). The assumption here is that things 
that can be more easily recalled for one reason or 
another will be dubbed as more prevalent. This 
assumption is validated again by the house on fire 
example previously alluded to. Subjects primed with 
a picture of a burning house will report that house 
fires occur more often than those who were not 
primed with the picture (Tversky, 1974, p. 1127). 
A recent monetary example of this element 
of the heuristic at work would be when people pull 
their money out of the stock market after a huge 
crash, such as the crash that occurred in 2008. While 
the rational market tip is to buy low and sell high, 
people were doing the exact opposite, pulling out of 
the market at its lowest point. And you could count a 
lot of people out of beginning to invest in the stock 
market during the crash (Nocera, 2008). In both of 
these cases, the availability heuristic was likely at 
work. While rationally, investing for the first time or 
sticking with a diversified portfolio might have made 
the most sense over time, people were being 
assaulted with headlines about the worst economic 
downturn since the depression and how the 
government needed to bail out large companies so 
that the entire economy would not go under. In the 
aftermath of all this negative fall out, it would be 
very easy for people to recall things going 
spectacularly wrong, and hard to remember that the 
stock market had very recently been and still would 
be a good investment on average over the long term. 
An offshoot of this inability to recall is an 
insufficient ability to perform a certain type of search 
for something in one's memory. For example, the 
classic test for this is asking subjects what is more 
common, words starting with the letter "r" or words 
where "r" is the third letter. A large number of 
subjects answer words where "r" is the first letter, 
since it is much easier to recall words by their first 
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letter than their third letter. This phenomenon likely 
stems from the fact that people perform searches for 
words by their first letter and almost never perform 
searches for words by their third letter (Tversky, 
1974, p. 1127). An example of this search error in 
monetary decision-making requires more of a subtle 
touch. Often people make shortsighted monetary 
decisions because they simply do whatever they have 
been doing without regard for other potential 
alternatives. Since they have often performed their 
chosen method for buying products or making 
investments, that style is easily recalled and applied. 
Also, confirmation bias will cause people to see the 
situation as confirming what they already believe, in 
this case that their monetary decision is a smart one. 
However, there could be better alternatives left 
unexplored because of the use of this heuristic 
(Nickerson, 1998, p. 175). 
Another bias examined is the bias of 
imaginability. There are some situations that are just 
easier to conceive of than others. For example, it is 
easier to construct all the possible two person 
committees from ten people than trying to construct 
all the possible eight person committees with those 
same ten people. With smaller numbers of committee 
slots, it is easier for a subject to mentally construct 
groups that entirely distinct from each other 
containing none of the same members. The more 
complex and difficult the situation becomes to 
imagine, these types of committees get harder and 
harder for someone to form, and so the total number 
of groups the person is able to imagine goes down 
(Tversky, 1974, p. 1128). The bias might help 
explain why people approaching retirement are 
reluctant to invest in annuities, which involving 
investing a sum of money and then having the 
annuity pay out a set amount of that money each 
year. This avoidance of annuities is especially 
peculiar when one considers they have a high relative 
utility. However, especially at retirement age, 
imagining the possibility of death could be much 
more salient than the possibility of living to an old 
age. Taking this into account, many retirees might 
choose to invest their money other ways, since they 
would not want to lose the enjoyment they might get 
from their money by investing it in an annuity that 
could tie up some of those funds for a long haul they 
might not get to see. Their worry that they will not be 
around to enjoy the money overcomes logic and they 
choose to invest elsewhere (Hu, 2007, p. 78) 
Also, this imaginability bias can take 
another form entirely. If someone looks at the after 
graduation backpacking trip a student intends to take, 
he or she can probably imagine a lot of situations, 
like an avalanche, that the recent graduate would not 
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be able to deal with easily. However, how easily 
these situations are imagined is by no means 
correlated with how likely those events are to occur. 
In fact, focusing and planning for extremely unlikely 
disaster scenarios can take away valuable resources 
from considering and examining problems the 
backpacker is much more likely to face (Tversky, 
1974, p. 1127). 
Another bias that takes away attention from 
actual concerns is the illusory correlation effect. In a 
study that demonstrates this effect, subjects look at a 
drawing a mentally ill person had drawn along with 
that person's diagnosis. Subsequently, the subjects 
vastly overestimated how often things that would be 
intuitively related to a diagnosis, such as larger eyes 
in the drawings being correlated with suspiciousness. 
This illusory correlation continued to effect subjects 
even when the correlation between the two was 
actually inverted, where drawings with smaller eyes 
were directly correlated with suspiciousness (Rabin, 
1998, p. 29). This phenomenon could easily extend to 
monetary decisions. If someone has a belief about 
how a purchase might help her, she will likely see 
patterns that confirm this belief. As discussed earlier, 
challenging one's own beliefs can be incredibly 
difficult, and the illusory correlation plays a big role 
in that self-deception. This viewing of nonexistent 
patterns is completely unconscious, so no incentive 
will help anyone correct this line of thinking. 
The last heuristic Tversky and Kahneman 
examined was the anchoring and adjustment 
heuristic. The other two heuristics have at least made 
sense on the surface, even if one did not understand 
their pervasiveness or the depth of their impact. 
However, this heuristic has dizzying effects that defy 
any superficial logical explanation. Essentially, given 
a starting point, people cannot adequately adjust for 
what the actual value might be, meaning that one can 
easily influence the response given by introducing 
starting points of different values (Tversky, 1974, p. 
1128). To demonstrate this effect, experimenters had 
subjects observe a spun wheel that had different 
number values from 0 to 100. Subjects were asked to 
estimate whether the percentage of African countries 
in the United Nations was higher or lower than the 
spun number, then give their estimate of the exact 
percentage. 
The wheel was manipulated so that for half 
the subjects it landed on 65 and the other half it 
landed on 10. The average estimate of subjects who 
initially saw a 65 was 45 percent, while the average 
estimate of subjects who initially saw a 10 was 25 
percent. Again, these subjects merely saw that 
number come up on a spinning wheel that they had  
no reason to assume would be anything but random. 
However, this arbitrary number resulted in estimates 
twenty percentage points apart (Tversky, 1974, p. 
1128). Even scarier, these anchoring effects take hold 
even when the numbers serving as anchors are 
entirely ridiculous. Everyone knows that the average 
temperature of San Francisco is nowhere near 558 
degrees Fahrenheit, and as amazing as the Beatles 
were they did not have anywhere near 100,025 top 
ten albums. However, subjects in both cases gave 
significantly higher estimates than those who were 
primed with a low anchoring number (Poundstone, 
2010, p. 13). 
Anchoring also explains why people 
erroneously tend to choose conjunctive events or 
disjunctive events while trying to win a bet. 
Logically, the conjunctive events, where the first one 
must occur for the second one to even be possible, 
are less likely to occur because if the first event fails 
the second event cannot even occur, reducing the 
possibility of a favorable outcome to zero. In 
disjunctive events, only one of the events has to 
succeed to have a favorable outcome. When the focus 
of a subject narrows to the apparently higher 
probabilities of the conjunctive events, they anchor to 
it and cannot sufficiently adjust for the fact that the 
disjunctive events actually offer better mathematical 
odds (Tversky, 1974, p. 1129). Anchoring is hugely 
important when one considers pricing and value of 
various objects people purchase. What exactly makes 
a car worth $20,000? Or a jar of peanut butter $3.49? 
People often cannot comprehend something's 
absolute value, so they rely entirely on comparison to 
other similar goods. A car that seems similar to the 
$20,000 car might seem like a steal at $18,000 even 
if the car's absolute worth is only $5,000 
(Poundstone, 2010, p. 204). 
While lay people are often completely 
unaware of this fact, people who sell things for a 
living know the trick well. The author of this paper 
recently visited a country where bargaining is the rule 
in monetary transactions. In markets, the sellers 
would start out with prices so high that naïve people 
assumed that the product was worth about that much, 
and only bargain down to a slightly lower price. 
However, savvy buyers would name a very low price 
first and walk away if the seller named too high a 
price in return. Both sides were attempting to use 
anchoring to their advantage, and the key factor 
seemed to be the willingness to walk away. Often in 
monetary transactions, the possibility of not buying a 
product or service seems too inconvenient to consider 
walking away. Perhaps the willingness to walk away 
in bartering situations gives people a low anchor, the 
potential that this particular service or good is worth 
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zero in that particular context, which helps them 
avoid overpaying. 
Preference reversals are another beyond 
mind-blowing effect examined by Tversky and 
Kahneman. In another reversal, Tversky and 
Kahneman did not perform the original work on this 
theory. The original examination of the stunning 
effect was actually done by Ward Edwards, Sarah 
Lichtenstein, and Paul Slovic. Slovic later 
collaborated with Tversky and Kahneman to dissect 
the possible causal mechanisms. In the research 
scenario, subjects are offered the choice between a 
bet where they have a high chance of winning a small 
amount of money or losing a tiny amount of money, 
designated as the P bet, or a very low chance of 
winning a lot of money and a high chance of losing a 
moderate amount of money, designated as the $ bet. 
In the original study done by Slovic and Lichtenstein, 
the subjects first went through a task where they 
looked at pairs of bets, one P bet and one $ bet. The 
subjects then indicated which of the two bets they 
preferred. Then, after an hour of filler tasks, the 
subjects were shown first 6 unrelated bets and then 
the 13 bets that they had seen before in the previous 
preference task. The subjects were then asked for 
each bet separately to give an amount of money they 
would cause him to not care whether he got to play 
the bet or accept the selling price (Lictenstein, 1971, 
p. 47). Out of 173 subjects, 123 of them said that they 
preferred the P bet during every preference choice, 
but without fail said they would demand a higher 
selling price for the $ bets. Nearly every subject 
reversed preferences at least once. Essentially, the 
subjects were saying they preferred one bet, but 
placed a higher dollar value on the other one. This 
experiment was replicated several times with slight 
variations, such as having people bid on the bets 
instead of thinking about a selling price (Lichtestein, 
1971, p. 47-55). That variation in particular was done 
to combat the endowment effect, where people 
overvalue something they already have from a 
monetary standpoint. During all those replications, 
the preference reversal still occurred. 
A phenomenon like this seems like it must 
be an artifact of a research laboratory. The paper did 
receive some criticism, especially that people who 
knew that there was no money involved were simply 
being lazy and not attending enough to the 
information given to them to make correct decisions 
(Poundstone, 2010, p. 72). However, an opportunity 
arose to show that this phenomenon occurred when 
there were much higher stakes in a real world setting. 
Edwards had a benefactor who owned a large casino 
in Las Vegas. The benefactor allowed the 
experimenters to run a ten-week study with no house 
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advantage to test if the preference reversal translated 
to real life scenarios. The game was extensive and 
transferred the principles of the laboratory to a 
roulette game with adjustments to ensure the honesty 
of participants. The results were the same, the P bets 
were preferred and the $ bets were priced higher, and 
this was when the participants were playing with 
their own money. The greatest loss and adjusted for 
inflation were both around $500, but a particularly 
intriguing statistic was that the average player lost 
money (Poundstone, 2010, p. 74). This occurred 
despite the complete lack of a house advantage. The 
implications of these preference reversals cannot be 
understated. They shatter the idea that people make 
choices based on the greatest expected utility of those 
decisions. When asked to evaluate choices in terms of 
preference, people go with the seemingly rational, 
safe decision. However, once they have to describe 
their preferences in dollar amount, people completely 
lose their bearings. But how is all this related back to 
Tversky and Kahneman? The explanation for the 
causal mechanism of preference reversals is the 
anchoring and adjusting heuristic proposed by the 
dynamic duo of Tversky and Kahneman. They 
proposed that when subjects had to describe the bets 
in terms of money, they anchored to other monetary 
amounts, namely the higher prizes. When they tried 
to adjust to that anchor they performed insufficient 
judgments, consistent with principles of the heuristic, 
and therefore the monetary valuations were closer to 
the high prize. When looking at the pairs of bets they 
preferred and no need to give a monetary answer, the 
subjects went with the bet they were more likely to 
win because their frame of mind was focused on what 
they wanted, not how they would exactly value it 
(Tversky, 1990, p. 215). The author chose to focus on 
this original preference reversal paper because it is 
considered to be the paper that revolutionized the 
field. However, the experimenters ended up using 
work by Tversky and Kahneman that explained the 
causal mechanism of the phenomenon. Lichtenstein, 
Slovic, and Edwards may have fired the first shot of 
the revolution, but Tversky and Kahneman were the 
ones who understood how to load the gun. 
As evidenced by the myriad of previous 
examples, Tversky and Kahneman's original papers 
provided the foundation for much of the future work 
done on the monetary decision making process. One 
of the main features of all of these heuristics is that 
incentives to overcome them did not diminish their 
effects. As Kahneman stated in a later paper, 
incentives can eliminate careless errors, but they will 
not nullify complete cognitive self-deceptions 
(Kahneman, 1991, p. 144). Going back to the 
confused players trying out for the basketball team, 
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being paid just to perform well at the tryout might 
have eliminated some careless free kicks, but the 
players would have still been playing soccer instead 
of basketball. So, even when people are trying to play 
close attention and perform their best because there 
are real stakes, they still make the same mistakes. 
These mistakes are not limited only to everyday 
people. Even highly trained researchers make the 
same mistakes if the situation is disguised sufficiently 
(Tversky, 1974, p. 1130). 
So what is the ideal decision making 
process? Since a wide variety of studies examined 
thus far have looked at the fallacies of heuristics, an 
obvious option would be to endorse a completely 
rational decision making process. In this process, 
people would determine all their options, compute 
the probability of that outcome occurring, and assess 
the desirability of each of those potential outcomes 
(Bohanec, 1988, p. 60). However, there are several 
aspects of this system that cast doubt upon its fitness 
as a one size fits all decision making model. For 
instance, in practical situations it is often impossible 
to conceive of all the possible alternatives to a 
monetary choice. Will the car someone really want 
go on sale in a week after they bought the car that 
made the most sense financially? Will having onion 
rings make someone happier than the side salad they 
purchased instead? Is there another small market 
stock someone would have a better chance seeing 
long terms gains from? The alternatives to nearly 
every choice people make in the real world can seem 
endless, and taking time even to try to list all the 
plausible would, in a myriad of cases, be 
spectacularly inefficient. One could argue, as has 
been stated earlier in this paper, that heuristics are 
time savers that sacrifice accuracy for speed. 
However, there is an emerging literature that suggests 
the possibilities that using heuristics, paradoxically, 
might be the most rational way to make decisions in 
given contexts, even more so than the rational 
decision making model (Gigerenzer, 2011, p. 455). 
The environmental structure, dictated by uncertainty, 
redundancy of the cues, sample size, and the 
uniformity of the cues, can determine both if the use 
of heuristics are appropriate at all and which 
heuristics are appropriate in that given context. Also, 
there is some evidence that there is such thing as 
information overload, where having only a few 
pieces of information can lead to better predictive 
abilities of outcomes than having all of the  
information (Gigerenzer, 2011, p. 455). However, 
there needs to be further expansion upon this research 
to topple the paradigm of heuristics as sacrificing 
accuracy for the sake of time. 
Further examination of the effects of 
emotion on the decision-making process is necessary. 
Real-life monetary decisions are never made in a 
vacuum, they are made by harried schoolteachers, 
stressed parents, and sad executives. Further 
understanding how emotions play a role in these 
decisions will allow people to put themselves in the 
best possible situations when making important 
decisions. 
Overall, monetary decision-making is even 
more complicated than it is at face value. Not only 
must one take into account a myriad of numbers and 
options, one must take into account the actual 
decision-making process and all the potential pitfalls 
on the road to good decisions. One of the more 
discouraging elements of the data gathered on the 
heuristics in particular was that even once subjects 
were made aware of the heuristics themselves the 
heuristically-oriented thinking remained. However, 
there are some bright spots. For example, merely 
phrasing the question differently can get people to 
attend to base rates, and if people are taught base 
rates they tend to attend to them in that context 
(Mellers, 1998, p. 462). If any wisdom can be derived 
from this paper, it is that people make monetary 
decisions far differently than they believe they do. 
Training oneself to realize when one is using those 
heuristics can be time consuming in itself, but likely 
worthwhile. If one can at least recognize when 
heuristics are being used, when a truly consequential 
choice is being made the individual can step back and 
make the decision in as well-informed a manner as 
possible Also, while heuristics may result in some 
errors, one has to decide how much his or her time is 
worth. Is the time saved by buying a slightly more 
expensive cereal box worth more or less the amount 
of money one would save by spending the time 
figuring out the least expensive cereal that that 
person enjoys? And what about the possibility of 
other cereals that he or she does not know about but 
could enjoy? Or the further possibility of other 
grocery stores that might be offering a better deal? 
Psychologists can statistically define how much 
people's time might be worth, but only the individual 
can decide how much his or her time is truly worth. 
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